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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CARE
FOR JOINT REPLACEMENT DEMONSTRATION PROJECT

THOMAS W. BREWER*
ABSTRACT
An often overlooked provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act is the authorization of demonstration projects which incentivize providers to
develop, implement, and test novel, cost-cutting approaches to care delivery.
One such project, the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement
demonstration project, encourages providers across the continuum of care to
collaborate on strategies that improve the quality of and lower the cost of
complete joint replacements. The project allows providers to share the benefits
of cost savings, and liabilities for cost overruns, across the surgeons performing
procedures, acute care facilities, and post-acute care facilities. Arrangements
of this type, outside of the demonstration project, could potentially expose
participants to liability under federal laws prohibiting certain financial
relationships between providers. It is therefore important to understand the
regulatory implications for the creation and operation of provider networks. It
is also possible these relationships may need to be unwound if the demonstration
project were to end. Finally, it is also possible these models may be adopted
outright and become permanent programs. This article will explore the
underlying regulatory structure implicated in cost-sharing arrangements with a
focus on those potential issues implicit in the Comprehensive Care for Joint
Replacement demonstration project.

* Associate Professor of Health Policy and Management, College of Public Health, Kent State
University. A previous draft of this article was submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the Master of Jurisprudence degree at the Loyola University of Chicago, School of Law. The
author would like to thank Nita Garg for her insightful comments and edits.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Health care is often referred to as the most heavily regulated industry in the
United States. 1 In 2004, the Cato Institute estimated health care regulation to
cost the average American household more than $1,500 per year. 2 While reliable
estimates related to the effects of regulation on the overall quality of care are
difficult to find, 3 it is nearly axiomatic that regulatory compliance on the part of
clinicians cuts into valuable time spent with patients. 4 One cannot help but
assume this intrusion has deleterious effects on quality of care as well as patient
and clinician satisfaction.
Federal regulations are clearly in the sights of President Trump. He signed
an Executive Order calling for two federal regulations to be purged for every
one new regulation promulgated. 5 Although it is too soon to fully understand
how this order will play out, Republican controlled Congress and like-minded
cabinet secretaries are not expected to offer any substantial pushback. 6
It is certainly not the case that our system of regulation has led the United
States to be a leader in the efficient delivery of health care. In fact, the United
States, despite spending the most on health care, both in terms of raw costs 7 and
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 8 lags far behind other modernized
countries in quality-of-care measures. 9 This is not to say that, given the complex
and fragmented nature of our health care system, we would not be worse off with

1. An Unhealthy Burden, THE ECONOMIST (June 28, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node
/9407716 (last visited Jan. 26, 2017); Christopher J. Conover, Health Care Regulation: A $169
Billion Hidden Tax, POL’Y ANALYSIS, Oct. 4, 2004, at 3.
2. Conover, supra note 1, at 1. This estimate is almost certainly inflated due to the inclusion
of health care services that are required by regulation (such as the cost of actually providing care
under EMTALA), not merely the costs of the administration of the regulation.
3. One report did find an increase in quality metrics from direct clinical regulation for longterm care residents. See CHARLES PHILLIPS ET AL., REPORT ON THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON
QUALITY OF CARE: ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON THE QUALITY OF CARE IN
BOARD AND CARE HOMES 2 (1995).
4. Robert I. Field, Why Is Health Care Regulation So Complex?, 33 PHARMACY &
THERAPEUTICS 607, 607 (2008).
5. Exec. Order. No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg 9,339, 9,339 (Jan. 30, 2017).
6. See generally Binyamin Appelbaum & Jim Tankersley, The Trump Effect: Business,
Anticipating Less Regulation, Loosens Purse Strings, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/01/01/us/politics/trump-businesses-regulation-economic-growth.html (last visited
Feb. 5, 2018).
7. KAREN DAVIS ET AL., MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL, 2014 UPDATE: HOW THE U.S.
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM COMPARES INTERNATIONALLY 8 (2014), http://www.commonwealthfund.
org/publications/fund-reports/2014/jun/mirror-mirror (last visited Jan. 26, 2018).
8. David Squires & Chloe Anderson, U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective: Spending,
Use of Services, Prices, and Health in 13 Countries, COMMONWEALTH FUND 8 (Oct. 2015),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2015/oct/1819_squires
_us_hlt_care_global_perspective_oecd_intl_brief_v3.pdf.
9. Id. at 7.
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a more laissez faire regulatory climate, but we should be able to agree that what
we have now is not producing the kinds of results we would like to see as a
nation. Moreover, the cost of health care is expected to grow at a rate higher than
the expansion of the overall economy in the foreseeable future. 10
There have been numerous attempts, with varying levels of success, in the
past seventy-five years to reform and/or control the cost of health care. 11 Riding
an electoral wave in the 2008 election that brought single-party control to
Congress and the White House, the Obama administration was able to negotiate
passage of the most comprehensive health care reform and expansion legislation
since President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society created Medicare and
Medicaid. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 12 affected
patients and payors by mandating coverage, emphasizing preventative services,
expanding public programs such as Medicaid, creating a system of subsidies and
penalties to incentivize individuals to purchase health care on newly created
exchanges, and requiring expanded coverage from private insurers. 13
The ACA figured prominently in the political rhetoric of the last presidential
campaign. 14 Although efforts at an immediate “repeal and replace” have stalled,
it is almost certain that many aspects of this legislation will be modified or
abandoned under ensuing legislation. 15 Despite strong support in some quarters
for repealing “Obamacare,” many of the law’s constituent parts such as
protection for care of pre-existing conditions, dependent coverage until age
twenty-six, and coverage for birth control enjoy broad support. 16 This
conundrum may mean that certain aspects of the law will remain with us for
some time. Thus, it is still useful to look at the history of the law.
While the ACA stopped short of introducing a single-payor system, it
contains multiple provisions aimed at reforming the very structure of health care

10. See Sean P. Keehan et al., National Health Expenditure Projections, 2015–25: Economy,
Prices, and Aging Expected to Shape Spending and Enrollment, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1522, 1528
(2016).
11. Catherine Hoffman, National Health Insurance—A Brief History of Reform Efforts in the
U.S., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1 (2009), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013
/01/7871.pdf.
12. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
13. Even a cursory discussion of the Affordable Care Act would be well outside the scope of
this article. See generally Summary of the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1–10
(2013), http://files.kff.org/attachment/fact-sheet-summary-of-the-affordable-care-act.
14. PEW RESEARCH CTR., 2016 CAMPAIGN: STRONG INTEREST, WIDESPREAD
DISSATISFACTION 31 (2016), http://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-20
16-election/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).
15. See Compare Proposals to Replace the Affordable Care Act, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.
(Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.kff.org/interactive/proposals-to-replace-the-affordable-care-act/
(last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
16. See id.
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delivery in the United States. 17 One such change is the move toward Medicare
and Medicaid reimbursement systems that incentivize providers to control costs
and increase efficiency through collaboration with other providers along the
continuum of care. 18 This provision seeks to move away from traditional feefor-service reimbursement that rewards volume over quality and efficiency. 19
The ACA created the Innovation Center within the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) to create, implement, and evaluate new care-delivery
and payment models. 20 One broad category of such innovative models is defined
as Episode-Based Payment Models (EPM). 21 These models, generally speaking,
hold providers accountable for the price of a course of treatment for some set
period of time. 22 This time period can include the days before a planned
procedure, such as joint replacement, and continue through the procedure itself
and subsequent skilled nursing care. 23
EPM, and in fact many of these innovative strategies, are aimed at
incentivizing business and clinical practice habits that control cost and increase
quality. 24 Unfortunately, the desired behaviors often run counter to practices that
CMS has worked hard to eliminate, or at least control, in a fee-for-service
environment. 25 The ACA foresaw this inherent tension and granted the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) the ability to waive certain aspects of
fraud and abuse regulation for CMS Innovation Center programs. 26
Providers across the health care continuum are faced with myriad
uncertainties when operating in this new environment. EPMs and other CMS
Innovation Center models tend to be quite complex and require coordination
across numerous providers with varying levels of compliance sophistication.
The very fact that these programs are experimental in nature adds to the

17. See id.
18. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 13, at 10.
19. Transitioning to Episode-Based Payment, CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY & PAYMENT
REFORM (Apr. 12, 2009), http://www.chqpr.org/downloads/TransitioningtoEpisodes.pdf.
20. About the CMS Innovation Center, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://in
novation.cms.gov/About/index.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).
21. For a complete list of models, see Innovation Models, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/index.html#views=models (last visited Feb. 8,
2018).
22. Id.
23. EPISODE-BASED COST MEASURE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE QUALITY PAYMENT
PROGRAM, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 8, 10–11, 14, 26 (2016).
24. CTR. FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY & PAYMENT REFORM, supra note 19.
25. THE LEWIN GROUP, CMS BUNDLED PAYMENTS FOR CARE IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE
MODELS 24: YEAR 3 EVALUATION & MONITORING ANNUAL REPORT 4–5 (2017), https://down
loads.cms.gov/files/cmmi/bpci-models2-4yr3evalrpt.pdf.
26. Social Security Act § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(d)(1) (2012).
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regulatory uncertainty. 27 In some cases, the unknown variable is how a particular
relationship will evolve throughout the course of the project. Entering into a
clinical and financial relationship across providers with any measurable degree
of uncertainty is an anathema to legal and compliance professionals in an
environment with increased consequences: both financial and potentially
criminal. 28 Programs such as Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI,
often referred to as BIP-SEE) 29 and Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) 30
are voluntary and can be entered into with careful organization and regulatory
planning. Other programs, such as the Comprehensive Care for Joint
Replacement (CJR) model, 31 are mandatory for providers in certain designated
markets.
Adding to the complexity is the fact that relationships between providers
may differ based on the Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG) of the patients they
share. 32 The relationship between an acute and post-acute provider may operate
under very different sets of regulations at the same time for different patients.
Finally, an almost constant stream of political rhetoric aimed at repeal of the
ACA adds another dimension of uncertainty.
This article will examine the implications of EPMs generally, and the CJR
model specifically, on fraud and abuse laws. The laws of particular interest are
the following: Stark Law, 33 the Anti-Kickback Statute, 34 and the Gainsharing
Civil Monetary Penalty Law. 35 The discussion will highlight areas where the
CMS waivers fail to insulate participants from exposure to fraud and abuse
liability for actual or intended conduct under the model. The article will also
look at how this uncertainty surrounding the actual scope of CMS waivers and
the overall uncertainty of the regulatory climate suppresses innovation in the
27. GLEN HEPBURN, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ALTERNATIVES TO
TRADITIONAL REGULATION 11 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/42245468.pdf.
28. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., MEMORANDUM TO
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL, INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CORPORATE
WRONGDOING 2 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download (last
visited Feb. 8, 2018).
29. Laura Dummit et al., Association Between Hospital Participation in a Medicare Bundled
Payment Initiative and Payments and Quality Outcomes for Lower Extremity Joint Replacement
Episodes, 316 JAMA 1267, 1267 (2016).
30. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
ACO PARTICIPANT LIST AND PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT 2 (2017).
31. Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/cjr (last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
32. The DRG system is used by Medicare, as well as some private payors, to classify diagnosis
for the purposes of reimbursement. Inke Mathauer et al., Hospital Payment Systems Based on
Diagnosis-Related Groups: Experiences in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 91 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 746, 746 (2013).
33. Also known as physician self-referral. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
34. Id. § 1320a-7b.
35. Id. §§ 1320a-7a(b)(l), (2).
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delivery of care and run counter to the stated goal of the program. The article
will begin with a brief discussion of the evolution of Medicare reimbursement
from fee-for-service to the current innovation models. The discussion will then
move to the operation of the CJR model and waivers of certain fraud and abuse
provisions to allow for foreseeable relationships between providers.
This is an important topic to explore for several reasons. In order to be truly
effective, bundled payment models need to foster collaboration and integrated
delivery of care between and among providers. Although health system
researchers, and most likely the majority of providers, understand on a
conceptual level the importance of coordinated care, the realities of a
decentralized and disjointed system make delivering integrated care difficult.
Furthermore, fraud and abuse regulations in the United States, which can
charitably be described as complex, are often suspicious of the types of activities
undertaken in order to deliver this care. Secondly, the risk to providers is very
high if they misjudge what is permitted under the demonstration project and
create an impermissible relationship. This risk would not only be in the form of
legal liability, but also in opportunity costs they would incur from not building
stable relationships that would withstand scrutiny moving forward. Finally, it is
important to understand as much as possible about the potential for liability
because of the mandatory nature of the program. Unlike voluntary
demonstration projects where providers can set aside, in advance, the resources
necessary to build compliant programs, CJR takes a “ready or not” approach to
participation. This clarity would be especially helpful for smaller providers, such
as independent skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) who may not have the legal
resources to make informed decisions regarding their participation.
II. MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT
Medicare as a source of revenue is extremely important for hospitals and
physicians. Medicare averages 40.9% of the payor mix in American hospitals. 36
A survey of multispecialty physician practices found the average payor mix
included thirty-one percent Medicare revenue. 37 Given the importance of
Medicare to the financial health of providers, changes in its reimbursement
schemes are impossible to ignore.
Medicare was created in 1965 when President Johnson signed the Title VII
Amendment to the Social Security Act. 38 Originally intended solely for the
36. Results based on most recently available data from 2009. 60 Things to Know About the
Hospital Industry | 2016, BECKER’S HOSP. REVIEW (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.beckershospital
review.com/lists/50-things-to-know-about-the-hospital-industry-2016.html (last visited Feb. 6,
2018).
37. MED. GROUP MGMT. ASS’N, COST SURVEY: 2014 REPORT BASED ON 2013 DATA 4
(2014), http://www.mgma.com/Libraries/Assets/Key-Findings-CostSurvey-FINAL.pdf?source.
38. Sanaz Hariri et al., Medicare Physician Reimbursement: Past, Present, and Future, 89 J.
BONE & JOINT SURGERY 2536, 2536 (2007).
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elderly, Medicare expanded over the years to include other groups (e.g., those
with end stage renal disease, those receiving disability payments from Social
Security, and select public employees). 39 The range of covered services has also
expanded to include broader home health services 40 and increased access to
prescription drugs. 41
In an effort to win the backing of wary health care providers, Medicare
reimbursement was based on exiting fee-for-service models which dominated
the industry. 42 These models reimbursed physicians at a reasonable charge,
which was defined as the lowest of three possible charges: the actual fee charged
by the physician, the physician’s customary charge, or some percentage of the
prevailing charges by other physicians in the area. 43 Under this scheme,
physicians had a financial incentive to raise fees 44 and provide more services. 45
Perversely, fee-for-service actually disincentives wellness initiatives as they
reduce demand for more expensive health care down the road. 46
The cost of Medicare skyrocketed. During the 1980s, the cost of physician
services rose 13.4% annually. 47 By contrast, the United States’ GDP rose an
average of 3.15% per year during the same time period. 48 First, Congress took
action by pegging reimbursement rates to the actual cost of delivering the
service. 49 Secondly, annual increases in reimbursement rates would be limited
by a formula which measured the total volume of services provided in the
previous year. 50 In 1997, Congress took further steps to limit the increase in
physician reimbursement by enacting the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR). 51 The
SGR attempted to tie the physician fee schedule directly to GDP and limped
39. Id.
40. Medicare and Medicaid Milestones: 1937-2015, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. 3 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/About-CMS/Agency-Information/History/Downloads/
Medicare-and-Medicaid-Milestones-1937-2015.pdf.
41. Id. at 7.
42. Hariri et al., supra note 38, at 2537.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. NETWORK FOR REG’L HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, FROM VOLUME TO VALUE:
TRANSFORMING HEALTH CARE PAYMENT AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE QUALITY AND
REDUCE COSTS 1 (2009), http://www.nrhi.org/uploads/nrhi-paymentreformprimer.pdf.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Billy Wynne, May the Era of Medicare’s Doc Fix (1997-2015) Rest In Peace. Now What?,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Apr. 15, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/04/14/may-the-era-ofmedicares-doc-fix-1997-2015-rest-in-peace-now-what/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
48. Kimberly Amadeo, The Strange Ups and Downs of the U.S. Economy Since 1929, THE
BALANCE (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/us-gdp-by-year-3305543 (last visited Feb.
6, 2018).
49. Wynne, supra note 47.
50. Id.
51. Social Security Act § 1848(f), 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4, amended by Pub. L. 105-33 111 Stat.
251 (1997).
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along until 2003 when it became clear it did not offer sufficient incentive spread
across a million providers to limit spending. 52 At that point, Congress undertook
a series of short-term, and sometimes shorter-term, patches to prevent physician
reimbursement rates from falling off a cliff. 53 A resolution to this chaotic
situation came in the form of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization
Act of 2015 (MACRA). 54 MACRA transitions physicians from fee-for-service
to reimbursement systems that incentivize quality over volume of care. 55
Physicians can choose reimbursement through Merit-Based Incentive Payment
System (MIPS) 56 or the Alternative Payment Models (APMs) discussed in this
article. 57
Hospitals share a somewhat parallel history of Medicare reimbursement
with physicians. Prior to 1983, hospitals were reimbursed retrospectively for
services provided. The system amounted to fee-for-service with all of the
associated drawbacks (e.g., cost increases in excess of inflation and limited focus
on quality). 58 In that year, Congress passed the Social Security Amendments of
1983. 59 This legislation was actually one of several steps taken by Congress and
HHS to move away from retrospective reimbursement. 60 What resulted was the
Prospective Payment System. 61 This system bases reimbursement on a DRG for
inpatient hospital services. 62 Each DRG is weighted based on the average

52. Wynne, supra note 47.
53. Had MACRA not been enacted in April 2015, physicians would have faced a 21.2%
reduction in Medicare reimbursement. See Keith Fontenot et al., A Primer on Medicare Physician
Payment Reform and the SGR, BROOKINGS (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/health
360/2015/02/02/a-primer-on-medicare-physician-payment-reform-and-the-sgr/ (last visited Feb. 6,
2018); Wynne, supra note 47; Joshua Hirsch et al., Sustainable Growth Rate Repealed, MACRA
Revealed: Historical Context and Analysis of Recent Changes in Medicare Physician Payment
Methodologies, 37 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 210, 211 (2016).
54. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2015).
55. Khaled J. Saleh & William O. Shaffer, Understanding Value-Based Reimbursement
Models and Trends in Orthopaedic Health Policy: An Introduction to the Medicare Access and
CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015, 24 J. AM. ACAD. ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY e136, e137
(2016).
56. Robert B. Doherty, Goodbye, Sustainable Growth Rate—Hello, Merit-Based Incentive
Payment System, 163 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 138, 138 (2015).
57. Saleh & Shaffer, supra note 55, at e139; STUART GUTERMAN & ALLEN DOBSON, IMPACT
OF THE MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM FOR HOSPITALS 97 (1986).
58. GUTERMAN & DOBSON, supra note 57, at 97.
59. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (2012)).
60. Id. tit. IV; see also GUTERMAN & DOBSON, supra note 57, at 97.
61. Prospective Payment Systems – General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/Prosp
MedicareFeeSvcPmtGen/index.html?redirect=/ProspMedicareFeeSvcPmtGen/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2018).
62. Id.
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resources expended to treat the condition. 63 Again, as with physician
reimbursement, acute care is moving toward APMs that draw focus away from
volume to value. 64
III. EPISODE-BASED PAYMENT MODELS
As with almost everything related to health care finance, EPMs defy a
single, parsimonious definition. However, as a practical matter, they involve the
payor setting a price, or target price, for all services rendered during a specific
episode of care. 65 These models work best in situations where the episode has a
clear onset and is expected to resolve in a fairly predictable period of time. 66 For
example, complete joint replacement, which will be the subject of this article, is
a well-defined episode of care. Chronic conditions, such as asthma or cancer,
are less amenable to this payment scheme.
In a literal interpretation of the model, the payor would strictly limit
reimbursement for the set price. Providers who were able to treat the patient for
less than the price would profit directly from the episode and those who overran
the set price would be in deficit. The current demonstration projects actually
operate with somewhat more flexibility. Reimbursement occurs as usual with
providers—hospitals in this case—receiving bonuses or penalties depending on
quality, cost, and patient satisfaction. 67
There are several demonstration projects that fall into the broad class of
EPMs which are sometimes referred to as bundled payment models. One
example, the BPCI initiative, is composed of four separate models which test
various permutations of reimbursement schemes. 68 Participation in BPCI is
completely voluntary.
The CJR model was initiated under Section 3021 of the ACA. 69 The model
tests the role of bundled payments in increasing the quality and lowering the cost
63. Acute Inpatient PPS, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Aug. 2, 2017),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/AcuteInpatientPPS/index.
html?redirect=/acuteinpatientpps (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
64. BPCI Advanced, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov/
initiatives/bpci-advanced (last visited Jan. 21, 2018).
65. NETWORK FOR REG’L HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, supra note 45, at 7.
66. Id.
67. Dave Barkholz, Under Construction: Risk-Based Reimbursement, MOD. HEALTHCARE
(Jun. 18, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160618/MAGAZINE/306189982
(last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
68. For example, retrospective bundled payments made for acute care only, retrospective
bundled payments for acute and post-acute care, retrospective bundled payments made for postacute care only, and prospective bundled payments made for acute care only. See Bundled Payments
for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative: General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-payments/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
69. On September 29, 2016, a letter was sent to the Acting Director of CMS, signed by 179
Members of Congress, demanding this program be halted. Signatories argued CMS overstepped its
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of care for Medicare beneficiaries undergoing hip and knee replacements. 70
These conditions were chosen in part because of their impact on the Medicare
budget. Hip and knee replacements cost the system approximately seven billion
dollars in hospital care alone each year. 71 What makes CJR unique is the fact
that, unlike BPCI, participation is required for providers in sixty-seven
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). 72 The MSAs were purposefully selected
by CMS to provide an adequate sample across differing sizes and historical
spending patterns. 73
The demonstration project puts hospitals at the center of the triggering
episode. Starting April 1, 2016, the cost-affected DRGs in selected areas will be
compiled for all necessary care from admission to ninety days after. 74 All
providers are paid in the normal manner. 75 Every year during the five year
project, hospitals will be assigned a target price for each DRG. 76 These target
prices will be stratified to account for the higher prices that naturally accrue to
patients with fractures needing emergent, more expensive care, as opposed to
elective cases. 77 The regional cost of treatment will account for one-third of the

authority by requiring providers in the designated markets to participate in the program, failed to
adequately engage stakeholders in the design and implementation of the program, and that the
program amounts to a medical experiment conducted without patient consent. As of the writing of
this article, there has been no official response from CMS. It is important to note that the main
author of that letter, Tom Price, later served as the Secretary of Health and Human Services. In that
capacity he exercised enormous authority of how the program was administered. Letter to Andrew
Slavitt & Patrick Conway, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Sept. 29, 2016), https://c.ymcdn.
com/sites/www.clinicalresearchforum.org/resource/resmgr/docs/news_&_announcements/ccts/
CMMI_Letter_Final.pdf.
70. MS-DRG 469 (Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity with major
complications or comorbidities) or 470 (Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity
without major complications or comorbidities). See Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement
Model, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://innovation.cms.gov/in
itiatives/CJR (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
71. See Melanie Evans, Knee and Hip Bundled-Payment Challenge Is About to Start, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 26, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160326/MAGAZINE
/303269996 (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. 100-19 DEMONSTRATIONS,
TRANSMITTAL 140 1 (Feb. 19, 2016).
75. See Doherty, supra note 56, at 138; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra
note 20.
76. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., COMPREHENSIVE CARE FOR JOINT
REPLACEMENT (CJR) MODEL: PROVIDER AND TECHNICAL FACT SHEET, THE CENTER FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID INNOVATION 4 (2015), https://innovation.cms.gov/Files/fact-sheet/cjrproviderfs-finalrule.pdf.
77. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (2012)); see Doherty, supra note 56, at 138; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 20; Evans, supra note 71.
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calculated target price in the first year of the demonstration but will solely
determine the target in years three, four, and five. 78
At the conclusion of each performance year, the actual spending and quality
metrics are compared to the targets. 79 If the aggregate episodes of care fell under
targets (if they cost less), the hospital could receive a bonus. 80 However, if the
episodes equaled more than the target price, the hospital could be forced to
reimburse some portion of the difference. 81 Hospitals are exempt from penalties
during the first year. 82 The program does place a cap on potential bonuses and
penalties. 83 For the first program year, participants will be held harmless and
excused from potential repayments if the aggregate cost of care exceeds the
target price. 84 Beginning in the second year, repayment of overage will be
capped at five percent. 85 That figure rises to ten percent in year three, and twenty
percent in years four and five. 86 These caps limit the potential shock as providers
make the necessary adjustments. Reconciliation payments from CMS to the
provider are capped at five percent in years one and two. 87 These caps rise to ten
percent in year three and twenty percent in years four and five. 88
Quality is measured using a complicated composite score consisting of
measures of medical outcomes and patient satisfaction. 89 Medical complications
within the ninety day window, such as acute myocardial infarction, pneumonia,
sepsis, bleeding, pulmonary embolism, mechanical complications related to the
prosthetic, and related infections, are factored into the measure. 90 The score
includes patient satisfaction domains as captured by eleven measures of the
Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems
(HCAHPS) Survey. 91 The model also allows for the “voluntary submission of
Patient Reported Outcomes (PRO)” data. 92 Through a complicated scoring
formula, individual hospital quality measures will be weighted and compared

78. Evans, supra note 71.
79. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 30.
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 20.
82. Evans, supra note 71.
83. Id.
84. 42 C.F.R. § 510.305 (2016).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. CMMI Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model: Quality Measures, Voluntary
Data, Pub. Reporting Processes for Preview Reports, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.
1 (2016), http://www.wsha.org/wp-content/uploads/CJR-Medicare-Quality-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id. at 4.
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against national averages. 93 Those hospitals with better quality scores will be
given a “discount” off of the overall cost of their procedures proportional to
where they rank nationally. 94 This will have the practical effect of making those
hospitals then appear more efficient from a cost standpoint. 95
As the hospital bears the exposure to cost overruns for physicians and
skilled/home nursing care, it is imperative it find ways to curb these costs as
well. Nursing homes in particular are fertile ground for finding new efficiencies.
In a 2015 study of joint replacement costs using three years of Medicare data,
researchers found a $10,000 average difference between the highest and lowest
cost providers in three northeast states. Nursing home spending accounted for
sixty percent of this cost difference. 96 This finding demonstrated the variability
in the cost of skilled nursing care in those markets. 97 As will be discussed later,
hospitals are finding new ways to select and work with post-acute providers
across the spectrum of services.
As post-acute care ideally represents the back end of the episode of care,
physicians represent the front end. It is the physician (in this case, most likely
an orthopedist) that orders the joint replacement and initiates the episode of care.
Playing such a key role in the process, it would make sense that these clinicians
have the ability to share in any potential reconciliation payments as well, beyond
their normal Medicare Part B reimbursement. The CJR model allows for
“collaborator[s]” 98 to enter into a Participation Agreement that allows for the
sharing of cost savings and reconciliation payments made pursuant to the
program. 99 Historically, these payments would have been prohibited by Section
1128A(b)(1) of the Social Security Act, which prohibited a hospital from
“making a payment, directly or indirectly, to induce a physician to reduce or
limit services to Medicare or Medicaid beneficiaries under the physician’s

93. Id. at 17.
94. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 89, at 17–18.
95. Id. at 18.
96. Evans, supra note 71.
97. Id.
98. Hospital collaborators are not limited to physicians; they include “skilled nursing facilities
(SNF),” “home health agencies (HHA),” “long-term care hospitals (LTCH),” “inpatient
rehabilitation facilities (IRF),” and “physician group practices (PGP).” See 42 C.F.R. § 510.2
(2017). Non-physician practitioners, as well as providers and suppliers of therapy services, are also
included. Id. It should be noted that hospitals may not enter into gainsharing arrangements with
certain organizations that are neither providers nor suppliers. See id. § 510.500.
99. Id. § 510.2.
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care.” 100 Hospitals and physicians involved in these payments are liable for a
$2,000 civil monetary penalty (CMP) per patient. 101
One researcher pointed out the CMP could stand as perhaps the most
significant regulatory hurdle to successful implementation of value-based
payment models. 102 The law did not distinguish between “medically necessary”
and/or “medically unnecessary care.” 103 The CJR program did specifically
waive restrictions on gainsharing payments that are spelled-out in sharing
agreements. 104 It is worth noting that the CJR program requires that the decision
of hospitals to enter into sharing agreements must be made, in part, on the quality
of care to be delivered to the beneficiary during the episode. 105
In addition to specific waiver of gainsharing provisions in the CJR, an even
larger development came when MACRA 106 inserted a key qualifier into the
statutory language. MACRA inserted the words “medically necessary” into the
CMP statute after “reduce or limit.” 107 This allows for payments to physicians
to induce the limitation of unnecessary services. This provision is seen as an
entrée for providers to enter into gainsharing agreements outside of waived
demonstration projects. 108 The provision in MACRA does not completely render
moot any discussion of the compliance implications of gainsharing in general,
or in bundled payment programs specifically. 109 Commentators do see this as a
move by CMS to reserve gainsharing enforcement to those instances where
physicians are limiting necessary services. 110 However, given its recency and

100. Special Bulletin: Gainsharing Arrangement & CMPs for Hospital Payments to Physicians
to Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN. (1999), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/gainsh.htm (last visited
Feb. 9, 2018).
101. Id.
102. Corbin Santo, Walking a Tightrope: Regulating Medicare Fraud and Abuse and the
Transition to Value-Based Payment, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1377, 1392 (2014).
103. Change in CMP Law Affecting Gainsharing Arrangements, STEVENS & LEE (May 4,
2015) (emphasis added), http://www.stevenslee.com/change-in-cmp-law-affecting-gainsharing-ar
rangements/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
104. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NOTICE OF WAIVERS OF CERTAIN FRAUD &
ABUSE LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE CARE FOR JOINT REPLACEMENT
MODEL (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-and-Abuse/PhysicianSelfReferral/
Downloads/2017-CJR-Model-Waivers.pdf.
105. Id.
106. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2015).
107. STEVENS & LEE, supra note 103.
108. Revisions to the CMP Law Open the Door for Gainsharing Arrangements with Physicians,
KUTAK ROCK (May 6, 2015), http://www.kutakrock.com/revisions-cmp-gainsharing-arrangementphysician/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018); STEVENS & LEE, supra note 103.
109. KUTAK ROCK, supra note 108.
110. Thomas E. Dutton et al., Congress Amends Gainsharing Civil Monetary Penalties and
Commissions Further Study of Gainsharing Agreements, JONES DAY 2 (2015), http://www.jones
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the uncertainty surrounding how CMS will ultimately enforce the updated
provision, it will not be addressed further in this article.
IV. COMPLIANCE IMPLICATIONS OF CJR MODELS
This section will examine the relationship between financial and treatment
arrangements fostered by CJR and traditional health care compliance statutes.
The analysis will begin with a discussion of the waivers put in place by CMS in
order to prevent the program from violating fundamental provisions of the health
care regulatory framework. A discussion of typical arrangements being put
together by providers and where these waivers are proving to be ambiguous or
failing to address these arrangements will follow. Finally, this article will
examine the implications and impacts of CJR preferred provider networks on
existing SNF steering regulations.
A.

CJR Compliance Waivers

Congress has provided the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation
(CMMI) with the authority to waive select fraud and abuse laws in order to
facilitate the implementation of payment model demonstrations that would
violate those laws. 111 Such waivers will be discussed below in the context of the
respective statutes.
It should be noted that each of the fraud and abuse laws discussed also have
the possibility of implicating the federal False Claims Act (FCA), which makes
it a crime to knowingly present, or cause to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval. 112 The FCA has a long history in United States
law outside of health care. It was first enacted to punish war profiteers during
the Civil War in 1863. 113 Because the basis for a FCA violation is the underlying
false or fraudulent claim, it is not subject to waiver. 114 The scrutiny turns
primarily to the legality of the underlying claim. 115 If that claim is legal, either
by its nature, or by effect of a waiver, the claim is not false or fraudulent and
would not form the basis for an FCA action. 116

day.com/files/Publication/a1d72edd-58e5-476b-a072-a611289dc63c/Presentation/PublicationAt
tachment/f426c3aa-386b-4a7e-85f1-b404234f158e/Congress%20Amends%20Gainsharing.pdf.
111. Social Security Act § 1115, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (2012).
112. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (A-C) (2006).
113. AMY BAILEY ET AL., HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE LEGAL ISSUES MANUAL 216 (Harry R.
Silver & Cynthia F. Wisner eds., 4th ed. 2014).
114. Does a Release Signed by an Employee Preclude Whistleblowing?, MCELDREW YOUNG,
https://www.mceldrewyoung.com/whistleblower/release/ (last updated Feb. 8, 2018); see generally
BAILEY ET AL., supra note 113, at 223–26.
115. See generally BAILEY ET AL., supra note 113, at 223–26; MCELDREW YOUNG, supra note
114.
116. See generally BAILEY ET AL., supra note 113, at 215.
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One important aspect of the FCA to discuss is the liability that attaches not
only to the person submitting the false or fraudulent claim, but to anyone who
causes a false claim to be presented. 117 This aspect of the law has been applied
in a wide variety of ways. For example, pharmaceutical companies that promote
off-label 118 use of their drugs may cause a pharmacy to file fraudulent cost
reports for prescriptions filled to Medicare patients because Medicare does not
pay for off-label use. 119 A widely-known example is a medical device
manufacturer who advised hospitals to perform the device implantation as an
inpatient procedure rather than as a medically acceptable, and less expensive,
outpatient service. 120 Almost 100 hospitals in the United States have settled FCA
cases with the Department of Justice (DOJ) over inpatient claims they
submitted. 121 The device manufacturer itself settled the case for seventy-five
million dollars. 122
Again, assuming that CMS waivers are sufficient and providers adhere to
the strictures, the FCA should not be implicated. However, as this is a
demonstration project, the idea is to push the boundaries of common practice.
One of the most attractive and promising ways to implement bundled payment
models is to increase collaboration among and between agencies. Providers,
especially smaller organizations without sophisticated legal departments or the
resources to pay large settlements, may be somewhat reticent to enter into novel,
untested, payment arrangements for fear of being caught in a stream of FCA
liability. In fact, there is a general climate of uncertainty following the decision
in Universal Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar in which the
Supreme Court affirmed the theory of implied certification of Medicare
claims. 123 While a thorough discussion of Escobar is outside the scope of this
117. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A-B) (2006) (emphasis added).
118. Off-label use is the use of a prescription drug for purposes other than that for which it has
been approved by the Food and Drug Administration. Richard C. Ausness, “There’s Danger Here,
Cherie!”: Liability for the Promotion and Marketing of Drugs and Medical Devices for Off-Label
Uses, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2007).
119. Id. at 1284–1326.
120. Steven W. Postal & Robyn Whipple Diaz, DOJ’s Kyphoplasty Initiative: AHA Urges
Greater Oversight in the Wake of Continuing Settlement Announcements, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE
(May 10, 2011), https://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba_health_e
source_home/aba_health_law_esource_2011_may_volume_7_issue_9.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2018); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, 32 Hospitals to Pay U.S. More
Than $28 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations Related to Kyphoplasty Billing (Dec.
18, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/32-hospitals-pay-us-more-28-million-resolve-falseclaims-act-allegations-related-kyphoplasty (last visited Feb. 8, 2018); BAILEY ET AL., supra note
113, at 223–25.
121. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 120; BAILEY ET AL., supra note 113, at 223–25.
122. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 113, at 223–25.
123. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (2016). Writing for
a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas held “[FCA] liability can attach when the defendant submits a
claim for payment that makes specific representations about the goods or services provided, but
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thesis and its ultimate application by the DOJ and trial courts remains to be seen,
it is seen by many as a lowering of the threshold to FCA liability. 124 It is
therefore important that the legality of the CJR arrangements, as they relate to
those regulations that could potentially form the basis of a FCA case, be
understood as completely as possible.
B.

The Anti-Kickback Statute

Initially enacted in 1972, the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) is a criminal
statute that prohibits individuals or entities from knowingly and willfully
offering, paying, soliciting, or receiving bribes, kickbacks, or other
remuneration in order to induce business reimbursement from Medicare,
Medicaid, and other federal health care programs. 125 AKS has been hailed as the
hallmark of a federal effort to limit fraud and abuse in federal health care
spending. 126 Originally a misdemeanor, 127 Congress amended the statute in 1977
making violation a felony that carries a maximum $25,000 fine, imprisonment
of up to five years, or both. 128 In addition to the criminal consequences, violation
of AKS will cause an automatic exclusion from federally-funded health care
programs and potential exposure to civil liability under the FCA. 129 The intent
standard was revised in 1980 to require proof that the individual or entity acted
“knowingly and willfully” when making the prohibited referrals. 130 In 1997 the
statue was again modified to include the potential for CMPs which lowered the
burden of proof 131 and allowed for penalties up to $50,000 for each act. 132
Because financial relationships between and among health care providers
are extremely complex, it is quite possible that certain arrangements, although
appearing to violate AKS, may in fact be quite proper and beneficial. Congress
directed the Secretary of HHS to carve out these relationships from AKS
scrutiny in the form of safe harbors. 133
An often used example of an AKS violation is one in which a medical
laboratory pays the referring physician an “interpretation fee” for the physician’s
knowingly fails to disclose the defendant’s noncompliance with a statutory, regulatory, or
contractual requirement.” Id. The Court further held that this liability is not contingent upon
whether compliance was expressly designated by the government as a condition of payment, and
the result of this decision is lowering the bar for potential FCA exposure. Id. at 1996.
124. See generally Robert Miller, Escobar Appears to Open the Door to More “Materially”
False Claims, 10 J. HEALTH LIFE SCI. L. 1, 6 (2016).
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a–7b(b) (2012).
126. Santo, supra note 102, at 1379.
127. THOMAS S. CRANE ET AL., WHAT IS THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE? 4 (2016).
128. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 113, at 231.
129. Id.
130. CRANE ET AL., supra note 127, at 4.
131. Preponderance of the evidence as opposed to beyond a reasonable doubt.
132. CRANE ET AL., supra note 127, at 6.
133. See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)-(y) (2016).
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time spent explaining the results to the patient. 134 Because the physician has the
obligation to explain diagnostic results to the patient as part of the standard of
care, this payment is unnecessary. 135 The payment basically serves as an
incentive, or reward, for referring patients to that particular lab. 136 These
arrangements have the potential to color the physician’s judgement into making
a referral based on the potential kickback, rather than on medical necessity. 137
This skewed judgment can encourage overutilization of services, which
ultimately increases the cost of providing care. 138
Gainsharing involves a hospital knowingly making a payment to a physician
for the purpose of inducing the physician to reduce or limit services furnished to
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries under the doctor’s care. 139 These type of
arrangements are not included in any of the AKS safe harbors. 140 An argument
has been made that AKS concerns in bundled payment models could be obviated
by simply hiring physicians as bona fide employees. 141 For physicians to
abandon private practice and for hospitals to take on expensive clinical
employees seems like a drastic step in order to satisfy regulatory requirements
of a narrowly-drawn demonstration project. A less dramatic step would be to use
an existing safe harbor that allows for personal service contracts. 142
Unfortunately, the requirements for the employment safe harbor are quite
complex. 143 Furthermore, these contracts must be for a year or more and set in
advance the compensation to be paid. 144 Given the experimental nature of the
CJR program, it would be almost impossible to set the value of the compensation
in advance. 145 Providers and physicians might be handcuffed by overly-specific
contracts that do not take into account the innovative relationships contemplated
under the program.

134. CRANE ET AL., supra note 127, at 13.
135. Bryan Murray, Informed Consent: What Must a Physician Disclose to a Patient?, 14 AM.
MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 563, 564 (2012).
136. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Blood Testing Laboratory to Pay $6 Million
to Settle Allegations of Kickbacks and Unnecessary Testing (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/blood-testing-laboratory-pay-6-million-settle-allegations-kickbacks-and-unnecessarytesting (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
137. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 113, at 231.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 35.
140. Santo, supra note 102, at 1401.
141. Id. at 1402.
142. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) (2016).
143. Santo, supra note 102, at 1404.
144. Id. at 1388.
145. Id. at 1401.
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In order to provide regulatory breathing space for CJR, CMMI used its
authority to waive Sections 1128B(b)(1) 146 and (2) 147 of the Social Security Act
related to the federal AKS. 148 The waiver is only applicable to the payment of
gainsharing and alignment payments 149 pursuant to properly structured sharing
agreements under the demonstration project. 150 It does not waive any other
remuneration a physician might receive while participating in an innovative CJR
model. 151 For example, if a physician were provided with office space in a SNF
in order to facilitate his seeing patients in the facility. 152 This scenario is outside
of the context of gainsharing and alignment payments and could very well
violate AKS. 153
C. Stark Self-Referral
During the 1980s as congressional attempts to move away from fee-forservice models began to take effect, 154 physicians sought to replace lost revenue
by investing in laboratories, diagnostic imaging centers, and outpatient surgery
centers where they could still bill separately for individual services provided. 155
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1989, Congress pushed
back against this conduct by including language which prohibited a physician 156
from referring certain “designated health services (DHSs)” 157 in which they, or
146. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (2012) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives
any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or
covertly, in cash or in kind.”).
147. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (“Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind to any person to induce such person.”).
148. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 104.
149. Alignment payments flow from the CJR collaborator (e.g., physicians’ group practice) to
the hospital in cases where the episode of care exceeded the target price and the hospital made a
reconciliation payment back to CMS. In short, alignment payments are the opposite of gainsharing
payments. 42 C.F.R. § 510.500(b) (2017).
150. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 104.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. For example, the Inpatient Prospective Payment System discussed earlier. See supra Part
II.
155. Santo, supra note 102, at 1379–80.
156. 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2017) (“Physician means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy, a
doctor of dental surgery or dental medicine, a doctor of podiatric medicine, a doctor of optometry,
or a chiropractor.”).
157. Id. (“[DHS] means any of the following services (other than those provided as emergency
physician services furnished outside of the U.S.), as they are defined in this section: (1)(i) Clinical
laboratory services. (ii) Physical therapy, occupational therapy, and outpatient speech-language
pathology services. (iii) Radiology and certain other imaging services. (iv) Radiation therapy
services and supplies. (v) Durable medical equipment and supplies. (vi) Parenteral and enteral
nutrients, equipment, and supplies. (vii) Prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies.
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an immediate family member, 158 had a financial relationship. 159 The basic
premise behind this law is that physicians who stand to benefit financially from
a referral will be more likely to make that referral without respect to actual
medical necessity. The eponymous legislation was championed by Congressman
Pete Stark. 160 Originally focused on clinical laboratory services, the legislation
was expanded in 1993 to include the current list of DHSs. 161
Stark Law allows for a variety of penalties including denial of payment,
refunds of payments already made in violation, and CMPs of up to $15,000 for
each improper bill or service and three times the amount of the improper
payment itself. 162 A CMP of $100,000 may also be imposed for each violative
arrangement scheme that the physician or entity knows, or should know, is
designed to assure improper referrals. 163 There are a number of exceptions to
Stark which are generally beyond the scope of this thesis. 164
Although seemingly straightforward, the definition of a “financial
relationship” can be somewhat more complicated. At its most black-and-white,
a direct financial relationship is one in which the parties share an actual
ownership or investment interest. 165 More difficult to define are prohibited
compensation arrangements between the physician and the entity providing the
DHS. A compensation agreement is defined as “any payment or other benefit
made directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind.” 166 Given the
interdependent nature of physicians and health care providers such as hospitals,
the term “benefit” could be any number of seemingly innocuous items or
benefits provided for the physician during the course of their practice. 167

(viii) Home health services. (ix) Outpatient prescription drugs. (x) Inpatient and outpatient hospital
services.”).
158. Id. (“[I]mmediate family member [means] husband or wife; birth or adoptive parent, child,
or sibling; stepparent, stepchild, stepbrother, or stepsister; father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law; grandparent or grandchild; and spouse of a
grandparent or grandchild.”).
159. 42 C.F.R. § 411.354(a)(1) (2016) (meaning a “direct or indirect ownership or investment
interest,” or a “compensation arrangement” with an entity that provides designated health services).
160. Steven D. Wales, The Stark Law: Boon or Boondoggle? An Analysis of the Prohibition on
Physician Self-Referrals, L. & PSYCHOL. REV., 2013, at 1, 2.
161. BAILEY ET AL., supra note 113, at 235.
162. Social Security Act § 1877, 42 U.S.C. § 1953nn(g)(3) (2012) (Physician Self-Referral
Law).
163. Id.
164. 42 C.F.R. § 411.355 (2012) (providing information on exceptions).
165. Id. § 411.354(a)(1).
166. Id. § 411.351.
167. See Susan O. Scheutzow, Challenges to Employed Physicians’ Compensation: Direct,
Indirect, or Unintelligible Compensation, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Feb. 2014, at 6–7; Debbi M.
Johnstone, Illegal Remuneration and Stark Law Issues Raised by Physician Recruitment
Agreements (Am. Health Lawyers Ass’n, Paper No. P02110416, 2004).
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Assuming the referring physician and the hospital had in place a gainsharing
agreement, the CJR program would, absent a waiver, violate Stark Law. The
referring physician would receive remuneration in the form of the reconciliation
payment as a result of the referral. There is some nuance in that the remuneration
in the case of CJR would not be a strict one-for-one for each referral. The
payments would be dependent on the quality of care, patient outcomes, and the
performance of many other actors in the episode of care. However, given the
broad application of Stark in the past, it is unlikely that such an arrangement
would withstand scrutiny absent an affirmative waiver. As with AKS, CMMI
used its authority to waive Section 1877(a) of the Social Security Act relating to
physician self-referral for the CJR model. 168
Given the similarities in the provisions of Stark and AKS, the potential
effects on CJR implementation will be discussed together. There are several
potential sources of liability in CJR, and other EPMs, as it relates to Stark and
AKS liability. Experts have noted the sheer complexity of the sharing
agreement, quality requirements, and the amount of documentation that must be
kept puts participants at risk for not satisfying the conditions of the waiver. 169
While the program is complex, the real risk comes from the program’s novelty.
Health care providers operate in a daily environment of complex legal and
regulatory guidelines. The real limiting factor is uncertainty regarding how these
regulations will be enforced and the lifespan of the program.
As discussed above, the real opportunity for gains under the CJR program,
both in terms of lower cost and higher quality care, is manifest in the ability of
the program to encourage collaboration along a continuum of care. 170 Under
existing models, it is tempting for participants in a patient’s care to focus on only
those aspects of the case in which they are ethically bound, legally liable, and
financially invested. Once the patient progresses through the case to the point
where they are being cared for by another entity, the previous provider may
simply shuffle them along. Similarly, providers further downstream may not
involve themselves in the patient’s care until it becomes their instant
responsibility. This disjointed system fosters poor coordination of care for the
patient and poorer, more expensive, outcomes. The CJR has the potential of
using market forces to foster increased collaboration.
A great example of the type of collaboration that is being discussed in the
context of CJR involves attempts to limit hospital readmissions from SNFs
following surgery. 171 Such readmissions are extremely costly and would
168. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 104.
169. Robert D. Stone, The Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Program: Bundle of
Joy?, 10 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 12, 15–16 (2016).
170. Id. at 12.
171. This example is based on the author’s participation in a Medicaid payment reform panel
in the state of Ohio. Although CJP is a Medicare program, many lower extremity joint replacement
patients are dual-eligible (that is, part of both the Medicare and Medicaid programs) and solutions
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negatively impact gainsharing. 172 As a result, hospitals have begun to work
closely with SNFs to detect and correct the underlying causes of the
readmissions. 173 Some causes are clinical. For example, due to the tight margins
many nursing homes operate under, it is difficult to recruit and retain high
quality registered nurses (RNs). 174 Many facilities rely on licensed practical
nurses (LPNs) with less training and a higher rate of turnover. One area where
this has been shown to affect patient outcomes is urinary catheter care. Without
the correct training on proper procedures, a facility may experience higher rates
of urinary tract infections, which in many cases lead to readmission to the
hospital. Hospitals have experimented with providing training to SNF nursing
staff on proper care. 175 It is hoped that this training will provide better care and
reduce costs. The financial incentive for the hospital is higher gainsharing
payments. 176
Another commonly reported cause for hospital readmission is SNF staff not
being able to accurately communicate patient status to physicians. For example,
patients often experience medical difficulties in the middle of the night or at
other times when physicians are not physically available. 177 During these
situations, nursing staff will contact an on-call physician by telephone to report
the issue. If the SNF does not have twenty-four-hour RN coverage, it could be a
LPN with less training making the phone call. If that nurse is not able to
confidently respond to the physician’s questions related to the patient’s
condition, the physician may simply order the patient readmitted rather than risk
doing nothing and having the patient deteriorate. In order to mitigate this
problem, select hospitals have experimented with training SNF nursing staff on
work to the benefit of both programs. See, e.g., Robert Mechanic, Post-Acute Care — The Next
Frontier for Controlling Medicare Spending, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 692, 692 (2014).
172. Id. at 692–93.
173. Id. at 693.
174. Skilled Nursing Facilities Should Prepare for a Future of Challenges and Opportunities,
HEALTHSTREAM (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.healthstream.com/resources/blog/blog/2016/11/02/
skilled-nursing-facilities-should-prepare-for-a-future-of-challenges-and-opportunities (last visited
Feb. 9, 2018).
175. See, e.g., Jenna Libersky et al., Value-Based Payment in Nursing Facilities: Options and
Lessons for States and Managed Care Plans, INTEGRATED CARE RESOURCE CTR. (Nov. 2017),
http://www.integratedcareresourcecenter.com/PDFs/ICRC_VBP_in_Nursing_Facilities_Novem
ber_2017.pdf; Joseph G. Ouslander & Robert A. Berenson, Reducing Unnecessary
Hospitalizations of Nursing Home Residents, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1165, 1167 (2011).
176. Libersky et al., supra note 175.
177. Eric Alper et al., Hospital Discharge and Readmission, WOLTERS KLUWER: UPTODATE
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.uptodate.com/contents/hospital-discharge-and-readmission?search=
hospital%20discharge%20and%20readmission&source=search_result&selectedTitle=1~150&usa
ge_type=default&display_rank=1 (last visited Feb. 9, 2018); Sandra G. Boodman, Shifting the
Risks at Night, WASH. POST (June 6, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health/
shifting-the-risks-at-night/2011/05/03/AGuEQaKH_story.html?utm_term=.eb01cd8aefb0
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2018).
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how to communicate with physicians. 178 This training often involves role
playing different scenarios, and aims to build clinical and interpersonal
communication skills. 179 Some hospitals have even flirted with the idea of
paying for physician coverage during overnight hours. Formal research related
to the effectiveness of this intervention is just now getting underway, but
colloquial accounts of success are promising.
On their face, these two examples of innovation collaborations do not seem
to implicate the existing fraud and abuse statutes above. 180 The arrangements as
presented do not include physicians referring patients in return for any
remuneration. The models are merely health care organizations collaborating on
initiatives to improve the quality of care. However, given that physicians are
included in potential gain/risk sharing, should the hospital choose to build that
model, it would make sense that they would be involved in the post-acute care
quality improvement as well. This increased involvement may begin to implicate
Stark and AKS.
Generally, a typical physician’s 181 relationship with a post-acute facility is
somewhat limited. The doctors simply follow their patients to the post-acute
settings and “round” on the them as they would in a hospital. 182 There are
generally no contractual or personal services agreements between the facility
and the physician. SNFs typically do not peer review, credential, or offer formal
privileges. 183 “The federal Stark Law does not impact the relationship between
an attending physician and an LTC [Long Term Care] Provider unless there is a
direct or indirect ownership or investment interest, or a direct or indirect
compensation arrangement, between the attending physician and the LTC
Provider.” 184 One author noted “. . . Stark Law makes it difficult for providers to
work together to voluntarily develop or implement various arrangements designed
to improve health care quality and control costs, including arrangements such

178. Diane W. Shannon & Leigh Ann Meyers, Nurse-To-Physician Communications:
Connecting for Safety, PATIENT SAFETY & QUALITY HEALTHCARE, Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 24.
179. Id. at 250.
180. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2012). Although outside the scope of this article, there are
concerns that hospitals assembling preferred networks of skilled nursing facilities that agree to
participate in these programs may implicate anti-trust statutes. Henry S. Allen, Jr. & George M.
Sanders, Chapter 6: Managing Antitrust Risks Associated with Accountable Care Organizations,
in ACOS AND OTHER OPTIONS: A “HOW-TO” MANUAL FOR PHYSICIANS NAVIGATING A POSTHEALTH REFORM WORLD 4 (Am. Med. Ass’n ed., 2013), https://www.acponline.org/system/files/
documents/running_practice/delivery_and_payment_models/aco/physician_howto_manual.pdf.
181. This does not include medical directors employed by SNFs or other physicians who have
a contractual relationship to provide patient care. James F. Miles, Physician Integration and Long
Term Care, Am. Health Law Ass’n 1 (2012) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.healthlaw
yers.org/events/programs/materials/documents/phy12/papers/k_miles.pdf.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006); 42 C.F.R. § 411.350 (2007)).
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as integrated delivery systems, pay for performance arrangements, gainsharing
arrangements, or bundled payments.” 185 While the CMS fraud and abuse statute
waiver specifically includes payments related to the gainsharing provision of
CJR, it does nothing to protect against liability for other potentially innovative
arrangements. 186 What if a SNF offered a referring physician free office space
in the facility to facilitate interaction with staff and patients? Office rental has
been a much-scrutinized target of anti-kickback enforcement and should be a red
flag to any physician. 187
D. SNF Referral
As discussed above, the SNF into which a patient transitions after a complete
joint replacement can have a significant impact on the cost of the overall episode.
In an EPM, this cost difference can have very real financial ramifications for the
hospital. 188 As such, hospitals have an interest in seeing that patients are referred
to SNFs that meet certain quality and care parameters that will produce a better,
more economical outcome for the patient. 189 Hospitals, and the care coordinators
who work with patients and patients’ families to select a post-acute placement,
have long been thought to “steer” patients into certain facilities. 190 There are
several reasons for why a care manager would guide patients to choose certain
facilities. On an individual level, the care manager may just feel that one facility
is simply better than others. If this opinion is based on objective measures,
particularly where a patient has a unique set of needs such as Alzheimer’s care,
that guidance would be within the professional judgment of the care manager.
However, it could be that a particular nursing facility simply has a strong
marketing department. It is also possible that the care manager receives gifts or
other gratuities from the nursing home in exchange for favorable referrals. From
an institutional level, hospitals may encourage care managers to refer patients to
facilities that are owned by the hospital.
To limit the practice of steering patients, federal law provides that the
referring discharge plan “shall not specify or otherwise limit the qualified

185. Nita Garg, Hospital Value Based Purchasing and the Bundled Payment Initiative Under
the Affordable Care Act: A Good Start, But is it Enough?, 22 ANNALS HEALTH L. 171, 189 (2013).
186. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 104.
187. Special Fraud Alert: Rental of Space in Physician Offices by Persons or Entities to Which
Physicians Refer, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. (Feb. 2000), https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsand
bulletins/office%20space.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
188. James Hegyj et al., Evaluating the Selection Process of Post-Acute Preferred Provider
Relationships, CARE MGMT., Aug.–Sept. 2016, at 1, 8.
189. Id.
190. Public Meeting, Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n 21, 29 (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/meeting-materials/october-2014-meeting-transcript.
pdf?sfvrsn=0) (last visited Feb. 9, 2018).
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provider which may provide post-hospital home health services.” 191 Many
providers took this to mean that the patient was simply to be provided with an
alphabetical list of facilities and left to make a decision alone. 192 In fact, many
care managers took it as a matter of professional duty that they not appear to
favor one SNF over another or risk subverting the patient’s autonomy in care
decisions. 193 The statute went on to say that care managers must inform patients
if they are being referred to a facility “in the hospital has a disclosable financial
interest.” 194 As a response to CJR and EPMs in general, hospitals have begun to
form preferred networks of post-acute providers in order to exercise some
control over the quality and cost of facilities into which their patients are
referred. 195 The question is whether the creation of “preferred networks” is
tantamount to patient steering.
Providers are being given very mixed messages on the legality of this
practice. The notice of waivers associated with the program simply reinforces
the existing prohibition against steering and refers readers to the Final Rule. 196
The Final Rule itself does not provide a definitive response. Language in the
Federal Register discussion of the Final Rule states:
Nothing in this final rule alters the [Conditions of Participation] CoPs and
similar requirements for providers and suppliers that furnish services to CJR
beneficiaries. If a participant hospital or its CJR collaborator is found to have
taken any action that threatens the health or safety of patients, including but not
limited to…steering beneficiaries to certain providers or suppliers, this final
rule allows CMS to take action against the participant hospital that is
noncompliant or has a collaborator agreement with the noncompliant entity. 197

However, that same entry in the Federal Register also tactility condones the
practice:
Physicians and hospitals may identify and recommend ‘‘preferred providers,’’ a
term used to include both providers and suppliers, which may include but are
not limited to CJR collaborators with sharing arrangements with the
participating hospital, as long as such recommendations do not result in
violations of current laws or regulations. 198

191. Social Security Act of 1935 § 1861(ee)(2)(H)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x (2012).
192. Hegyi et al., supra note 188, at 8–9.
193. Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, supra note 190, at 21, 29.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x.
195. See Hegyi et al., supra note 188, at 9.
196. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 104, at 4–5 (referring to 42 C.F.R.
pt. 510 (2016)).
197. Medicare Program; Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Payment Model for Acute
Care Hospitals Furnishing Lower Extremity Joint Replacement Services, 80 Fed. Reg. 226, 73,274,
73,463 (Nov. 24, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 510) (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 73,516.
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It is “sheer torture of the English language” 199 to suggest there is a discernable
difference between the prohibited “steering” and the permitted “identify and
recommend.” This difference becomes even murkier when one considers that
patients and families look to care managers for guidance in these situations and
are very likely to defer to their advice. 200 The ambiguity between these terms
was given voice at a meeting of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MEDPAC) with a rather protracted discussion of what was referred to as “soft
steering,” which was acknowledged to take place. 201
V. CONCLUSION
There is a distinction between the legacy fee-for-service payment models of
Medicare reimbursement and the emerging value-based payment models.
Concomitant to that discussion was an examination of fraud and abuse statutes
that were designed to control waste of federal health care dollars by limiting
financial relationships between providers. These limitations were necessary
safeguards as providers sought to make up revenue lost through cuts to
reimbursement rates. The theory was that providers would form relationships as
a way of increasing the volume of services that they themselves could not
provide and bill for individually.
Although found under a variety of names (e.g., bundled payment, EPM, feefor-value, value-based care), the emerging reimbursement models turn
traditional fraud and abuse concerns upside down. Instead of being wary of
provider relationships, the field has come to understand that fostering these
relationships may be the key to actually reducing health care spending. In fact,
these models actually provide financial incentives to form relationships.
Left in the middle of this revolution are providers as diverse as large, multistate integrated health care networks and small primary care providers. They
face widely divergent rules based on the type of patient they see, type of
procedure they perform, and geographic market they serve. Although CMS has
attempted to selectively waive fraud and abuse provisions as they deem is
appropriate, the wide variety of providers and approaches have demonstrated
areas where these waivers have fallen short. These gaps should not be viewed as
a failing on the part of regulators. They themselves face a daunting challenge of
encouraging innovation on the part of providers while at the same time
prohibiting the creation of practices that would encourage fraud, waste, and
abuse. Just as providers are trying to guess what CMS will allow, CMS is trying
to guess where providers may try to game the system. The uncertainty around
these programs will most likely increase as health care reform continues to be
politicized.
199. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (quoting Chief Justice Warren).
200. Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, supra note 190, at 22.
201. Id. at 55–57.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

274

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 11:249

The best-case scenario for the future of EPMs is that their efficacy be
determined by independent, thorough, and rigorous research. Assuming they are,
as many say, the future of federal health care payment, they should be introduced
across the system in a deliberate and thoughtful manner allowing for the system
to react appropriately. Once this transition is in progress, Congress and the
executive branch agencies need to take a close look at fee-for-service fraud,
waste, and abuse regulations and adjust those in a manner that guards against
improper relationships for private-pay clients but still allows for innovative
programs to flourish out of the public fisc.

